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Abstract
Weighing the importance of different pieces of information is a key determinant of making
accurate judgments. In social judgment theory, these weighting processes have been
successfully described with linear models. How people learn to make judgments has
received less attention. Although the hitherto proposed delta learning rule can perfectly
learn to solve linear problems, reanalyzing a previous experiment shows that it does not
adequately describe human learning. To provide a more accurate description of learning
processes we amended the delta learning rule with three learning mechanisms —a decay, an
attentional learning mechanism, and a capacity limitation. An additional study tested the
different learning mechanisms in predicting learning in linear judgment tasks. In this study,
participants first learned to predict a continuous criterion based on four cues. To test the
three learning mechanisms rigorously against each other, we changed the importance of the
cues after 200 trials so that the mechanisms make different predictions with regard to how
fast people adapt to the new environment. On average, judgment accuracy improved from
trial 1 to 200, dropped when the task environment changed, but improved again until the
end of the task. The capacity-restricted learning model, restricting how much people
update the cue weights on a single trial, best described and predicted the learning curve of
the majority of participants. Taken together, these results suggest that considering
cognitive constraints within learning models may help to understand how humans learn
when making inferences.
Keywords: Multiple-cue Judgment; Rule-based Processes; Learning
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Testing learning mechanisms of rule-based judgment
When making judgments, such as predicting a job candidate’s future performance or
assessing the value of a used car, people usually rely on information about the object of
interest, such as the job candidate’s skills or the car’s mileage and accident records. An
important predictor for judgment accuracy is the ability to correctly weigh the available
aspects according to their importance. For instance, a car’s mileage may accurately predict
how long the car will still run, whereas the time since its last cleaning may be less
prognostic. Social judgment theory has proposed that the weight people assign to different
pieces of information (or cues) when making a judgment can be estimated by linear
regression models —following the assumption that judgments are formed by weighting and
then combining the cue values linear additively (e.g., Brehmer, 1994; Cooksey, 1996). In
the following decades, social judgment theory has been successfully employed to
understand which aspects people consider in judgment and decision problems in a range of
applied areas, such as personality judgments (Hirschmüller, Egloff, Nestler, & Back, 2013),
sentencing decisions (von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009), personal selection (Graves &
Karren, 1992), or medical diagnoses (Wigton, 1996). Consequently, the notion that people
preferably weigh and add information has inspired theories of information processing across
a broad range of research areas from probability judgments (Nilsson, Winman, Juslin, &
Hansson, 2009) to impression formation (Anderson, 1971; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
Despite the success of linear, additive models in describing how people combine
different pieces of information (i.e. cues) when making judgments, our knowledge about
how people learn to infer each cues’ importance is still limited. Previous research has
proposed that the additive integration of weighted information emerges from a serial,
capacity-constrained hypothesis-testing process (Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008). Within
a trial-by-trial updating process these changes in each cues’ importance can be described
within a simple and widely used learning model, the least mean squares (LMS) or
delta-learning rule (Gluck & Bower, 1988; Sutton & Barto, 1981). Yet, although the LMS
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rule has been successfully applied to a variety of learning problems (Gluck & Bower, 1988;
Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Siegel & Allan, 1996), it neither describes learning of judgment
problems adequately, nor does it successfully predict how people weigh the importance of
different cues, as we demonstrate below. In addition, psychological mechanisms that may
limit this rule-based learning process have rarely been spelled out in detail (but see Kelley
& Busemeyer, 2008; Kelley & Friedman, 2002; Rolison, Evans, Dennis, & Walsh, 2012;
Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010) and learning models incorporating these constraints have
seldom been tested against each other.
The goal of the current research was to fill this gap and to investigate how people
may learn the cue weights in linear judgment problems within the class of LMS models. To
this goal, we examined how the LMS rule can be extended with different psychological
mechanisms to explain how people learn the importance of cues in multiple-cue judgment
tasks. In the following we give an overview on how people weight information in
multiple-cue judgments and review the LMS rule as a model describing the learning
process as well as how it deviates from human learning. Next, we extend this learning rule
by different psychological mechanisms to capture human performance and test these
psychological mechanisms against each other in two studies.
Rule-based models of human judgment
Social judgment theory (SJT) has proposed that people approach judgment problems
such as assessing the selling price of a car by considering the different aspects that could
affect the car’s worth, weighting them by their importance, and summing up the weighted
cue values. This idea has been formalized by portraying a persons’ judgments jˆt on each
trial t as a linear, additive function of the cue values xt,i weighted by their importance, the
cue weights wt,i, which can be mathematically modeled by a linear regression.
jˆt =
∑
i
wt,i · xt,i (1)
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with xt,∗=
[
xt,1 ... xt,n 1
]
where n denotes the number of cues and 1 denotes the
constant intercept. Accordingly, these rule-based models assume that people abstract the
importance of each cue and prescribe how the abstracted knowledge should be combined.
In principle, people can learn different kind of cue-criterion relations. In the current
manuscript we focus on how people learn the validities of multiple uncorrelated linear
predictors. We take this focus because research shows that people can abstract linear rules
in tasks in which the criterion is a linear, additive function of the cues (Hoffmann,
von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2016; Juslin et al., 2008; Scheibehenne, von Helversen, &
Rieskamp, 2015). The cue weights implied by linear rules also successfully predict
participants’ judgments for unknown objects (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp,
2014) and correspond well with people’s explicit judgment rules (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, &
Kleinmuntz, 1979; Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, & Shanks, 2006; Speekenbrink & Shanks,
2010). Furthermore, although people are able to learn more complex cue-criterion
relationships such as quadratic or even cyclic functions (Bott & Heit, 2004) or configural
cue-criterion patterns (Mellers, 1980), people show a preference for learning positive linear
functions and have a hard time picking up interactions between cues (Brehmer, 1994;
Lucas, Griffiths, Williams, & Kalish, 2015). Thus, before successful learning in more
complex tasks is tackled it seems important to understand how cue weights are learnt in a
linear task. We will consider potential extensions to nonlinear tasks in the general
discussion.
In linear additive judgments tasks, in which participants learn the correct weights of
cues over repeated trials with feedback, it has been shown that the cue weights estimated
from a rolling regression —a series of linear regressions fitted to a fixed set (or window) of
training trials and repeatedly moved one trial ahead —match people’s stated importance of
each cue across the learning phase (Lagnado et al., 2006). However, although the rolling
regression provides insights into the question of how the importance people assign to
different cues changes over time, this descriptive model is mute about the cognitive
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learning processes underlying changes in cue importance. Attempts to model these learning
processes mathematically have predominantly relied on the least mean squares rule to
adjust the cue weights over trials (Gluck & Bower, 1988; Kelley & Busemeyer, 2008; Kelley
& Friedman, 2002; Rolison et al., 2012).
The Least Mean Squares (LMS) rule
Learning the importance of each cue requires repeatedly updating the cue weights
based on feedback about the correct criterion. It has been suggested that people update
these cue weights by comparing two successively presented objects and relating the
difference in judgment criteria to the difference in cue values (Juslin et al., 2008; Pachur &
Olsson, 2012). This trial-by-trial updating process is mathematically captured by the
delta-learning or "LMS rule" (called "LMS rule" because it converges to the least mean
squares, LMS, solution Gluck & Bower, 1988; Sutton & Barto, 1981). In each trial t, the
judgment is made based on a linear regression model (Equation 1). After each trial t, the
cue weights are updated for the next trial t+ 1 depending on how much the judgment jˆt
deviates from feedback yt. The more the judgment deviates from the correct judgment and
the higher the learning rate λ is, the more strongly the cue weights should change in the
next trial. Changes in the cue weights ∆wt,i are more strongly attributed to those cues
with higher cue values, that is here akin to more salient features.1
1 In the present tasks all cue values covered the same range from 0 to 5 with higher cue values indicating a
higher salience based on cue intensity. Care was taken in stimulus design that the single cues are
approximately equally salient and that the cue values could be discriminated from each other. Therefore,
we assume here that all cues are measured on the same scale. One way to accommodate different scales in
learning models would be to standardize all cues, for instance to a range between between 0 and 1.
However, different scales imply as well different psychophysical properties of the stimulus, such as
differences in salience, and may impact on learning. How different scales interact with learning in judgment
tasks shall be addressed in future work.
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∆wt,i = λ · xt,i · (yt − jˆt) (2)
At the end of each trial the cue weights are updated with their associated changes.
wt+1,i = wt,i + ∆wt,i (3)
The LMS rule is formally similar to the Rescorla-Wagner learning model (Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto, 1981) and has been applied to describe conditioning (Siegel
& Allan, 1996), category learning (Gluck & Bower, 1988; Shanks, 1991), learning in
multiple-cue judgment (Kelley & Busemeyer, 2008), and reward-based learning
(O’Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley, & Dolan, 2003; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Tobler,
O’Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2006). In a first step, we aimed to evaluate how well the
LMS rule can describe participants’ judgments over the course of learning and then
investigated whether extending it with psychologically informed mechanisms can improve
the prediction of human learning.
Reanalysis: Comparing the LMS rule to a rolling regression
To investigate how well the LMS rule can describe learning, we compared the
performance of the LMS rule to a rolling regression model. The rolling regression can be
used as a measurement model to detect which cues people apply and how the cue weights
change over time (Kelley & Friedman, 2002; Lagnado et al., 2006), without providing a
description of the underlying learning mechanism. In a rolling regression, a linear
regression model is repeatedly estimated for a fixed number of judgments starting from the
first to the mth learning trial (where m indicates the window size) and this window is then
repeatedly moved by one trial ahead until it includes the last learning trial. For instance,
using a window size of 50 trials the rolling regression is estimated in the first step using
trial 1 to 50, next using trial 2 to 51, and so forth. With sufficiently small window sizes the
rolling regression can reflect any kind of changes in cue weights that occur during the
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learning phase and thus its goodness of fit provides an upper limit for the fit of any
learning model of the cue weights. We also estimated a baseline model as a lower limit any
learning model has to beat, which simply learns participants’ mean judgment over the
learning trials. To evaluate the performance of the LMS rule against the rolling regression
and the baseline model, we reanalyzed the linear judgment task from Hoffmann et al.
(2014). In this study, a linear regression model described participant’s judgment well at the
end of training and also best predicted judgments for new objects for the majority of
participants compared to an exemplar model.
Judgment task. In the judgment task, the criterion value ranging from 0 to 50
was perfectly predicted by four quantitative cues that could take values from 0 to 5. The
criterion value was a linear, additive function of these cues, y = 4x1 + 3x2 + 2x3 + x4.
Participants learned to predict the judgment values of 25 objects over 10 blocks with items
presented in random order in each block, resulting in 250 training trials. In each trial,
participants were asked to make a judgment and afterwards received feedback about the
correct outcome. After 250 trials, participants moved to a test phase in which they judged
15 unknown objects four times.
Comparison to a rolling regression. We used a rolling regression with a fixed
window of 50 trials and calculated the RMSD between its prediction for the last trial in a
window (hence trial 50, 51...) and participants’ judgment for this trial from trial 50 to 250
in the training phase. The last window of the rolling regression is akin to a linear
regression fitted to the last 50 training trials. For the LMS rule we assumed that at the
beginning of the task all cues have starting weights of zero, but that participants have a
starting bias corresponding to the intercept in a linear regression. This starting bias was
set to the participants’ judgment in the first trial. The model’s learning rate and standard
deviation were estimated by minimizing the negative log-likelihood between participants’
judgments and model predictions over all trials in the training phase (for details on model
estimation and comparison see Appendix B, for model parameters see Appendix C). Based
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on the cue weights in each trial we then calculated the RMSD between model predictions
and participants’ judgments from trial 50 to 250 as well as the RMSD for the last block of
training (from trial 226 to 250). We considered trials from trial 50 onwards because the
rolling regression estimates only one set of cue weights for trials 1-50 so that one cannot
compare changes in cue weights and model fit for early trials.
Table 1 summarizes the model fits, that is to what degree model predictions deviate
from participants’ judgments. Considering all training trials, the LMS rule outperformed
the baseline model, V = 12900 (paired Wilcoxon test), p < 0.001, 95% CI [-1.2,-0.6], but
did not meet the performance of the rolling regression model, V = 41328, p < 0.001, 95%
CI [3.1,3.8]. More importantly, the average RMSD of the LMS rule was almost twice as
high as the average RMSD of the rolling regression and close to the average RMSD for the
baseline model. To more closely track the learning path in the training phase, we compared
the cue weights estimated from trial 51 to trial 250 for the LMS rule and the rolling
regression (Figure 1). For the most important cue, cue 1, the rolling regression and the
LMS rule propose a similar learning path, but the LMS rule systematically underestimates
the importance participants gave to all other cues. Furthermore, the LMS rule suggests a
slow, but steady learning of cue 2 and cue 3, whereas the rolling regression weights suggest
that people only update the importance of cue 2 in early learning trials and do not update
the importance of cue 3. Hence, the estimated cue weights from the rolling regression and
the LMS rule show systematic deviations during the learning phase.
Although we think that the rolling regression represents a good measurement model
to identify the importance people give to different cues (without identifying the learning
process), it faces the danger of overfitting when estimated using only a small window size
(Pitt & Myung, 2002). The LMS rule, in contrast, was estimated based on all training
trials, thus restricting parameter estimates more strongly. A more conservative test of
model performance requires predicting new data based on the cue weights. Accordingly, we
used the resulting cue weights at the end of training (or the cue weights obtained from the
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last 50 trials for the rolling regression) to predict participants’ judgments for unknown
items in the test phase.2 Similar to the training results, the LMS rule captured judgments
for unknown items better than the baseline model, V = 5362, p < 0.001, 95% CI [-5.0,-3.2],
but still did not outperform the predictive performance of the rolling regression, V =
40772, p < 0.001, 95% CI [3.2,4.0]. Taken together, these results suggest that the LMS rule
cannot appropriately reproduce the learning path in rule-based learning, nor accurately
predict judgments for new objects after training.
Psychological constraints in rule-based learning
Why may the LMS rule fail to account for rule-based learning? The LMS rule implies
that the learning rate is stable across all learning trials and all cue weights are updated
with the same learning rate. Past evidence has accumulated that human rule-based
learning diverges in important ways from such an idealized learning process. First, studies
in which the cues’ importance changes over time indicate that people adjust to this change
more slowly than they acquired the solution to the initial judgment problem (Dudycha,
Dumoff, & Dudycha, 1973; Peterson, Hammond, & Summers, 1965; Summers, 1969; but see
Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010). Second, increasing the validity of one cue has been shown
to attenuate learning about the predictive validity of a second cue (cue competition effects,
Birnbaum, 1976; Busemeyer, Myung, & McDaniel, 1993a; Busemeyer, Myung, & McDaniel,
1993b) indicating that learning rates for one cue depend on the existence of another cue.
These phenomena have been traced back to different psychological mechanisms
altering the learning process. First, it has been assumed that people adapt to a task more
slowly, the more experience they gain with the task. Accordingly, this explanation proposes
that learning speed decays across learning trials (Kelley & Busemeyer, 2008; Rolison et al.,
2 In Hoffmann et al. (2014), the RMSD between model predictions and judgments in the test phase was
calculated using participants’ average judgment for each test item, not the individual responses on each
test trial. For this reason, the RMSD reported here deviates from the one reported in the article.
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2012). Second, it has been argued that learning rules in multiple-cue judgment tasks is
restricted by a limit in working memory capacity (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp,
2013, 2014; Juslin et al., 2008). A capacity limitation would constrain how much people
update the set of hypotheses on a single trial and, in turn, would cause cue competition
effects (Busemeyer et al., 1993b). Finally, it has been proposed that it is not a capacity
restriction per se that limits learning, but limited attentional resources and psychological
mechanisms guiding the distribution of attention during learning (Kruschke, 1996; for a
review see Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, & Wills, 2016). Accordingly, attention
may limit which cues people focus on during learning and how strongly they update
different cues. In the remainder of this article, we will first specify these psychological
learning mechanisms mathematically and then test these mechanisms against each other
and the LMS rule in two studies.
LMS rule with decaying learning speed (Decay)
Previous research supports the idea that the more experience people gain with a
judgment task the more slowly they adapt to a change in the underlying task environment
(Dudycha et al., 1973; Peterson et al., 1965; Summers, 1969) suggesting that people may
not learn with a constant learning rate, but the learning rate may decrease over time. A
decay in learning speed has been mostly instantiated in rule-based learning models by
decreasing the updating of cue weights based on the number of previous trials (Kelley &
Busemeyer, 2008; for a similar version see Rolison et al., 2012)
∆wt,i =
λ · xt,i · (yt − jˆt)
tδ
(4)
Parameter δ controls the decay rate with δ > 0 and thus the decay model possesses
the parameters λ and δ. A higher decay rate implies that the learning rate more strongly
declines with a higher number of learning trials. Indeed, it has been shown in some tasks
that including a decay parameter provides a better description of the learning process than
RULES IN JUDGMENT 13
the pure LMS rule (Kelley & Busemeyer, 2008; Rolison et al., 2012).
LMS rule with a capacity restriction (Capacity)
Theories of rule-based judgment put forth the idea that cognitive capacity
restrictions may affect rule-based learning (Hoffmann et al., 2014; Juslin et al., 2008).
Specifically, the comparison processes involved in learning from feedback require storing
and manipulating the judgment objects and thus may pose high demands on working
memory (Juslin et al., 2008). Supporting this idea, higher working memory capacity has
been related to a more accurate solution of rule-based judgment tasks (Hoffmann et al.,
2014). Reducing working memory demands by facilitating a direct comparison of cue
values in contrast speeds up learning in linear tasks (Juslin et al., 2008). Finally, findings
that the cues’ importance is often adjusted relative to the importance of all other cues as
well point towards the idea that learning is restricted by a cognitive capacity limitation
(Birnbaum, 1976; Busemeyer et al., 1993a; Busemeyer et al., 1993b). Specifically,
Busemeyer et al. (1993b) found that a moderately valid cue is perceived as less valid when
paired with a highly valid cue than when paired with a moderately valid cue (a cue
competition effect). Based on these results, the authors argued more generally that
previously proposed learning models, for instance the LMS rule, are not able to account for
these cue competition effect because they gradually converge to the optimal weights
(Busemeyer et al., 1993a). Instead, according to Busemeyer et al. (1993a), models
predicting cue competition effects need to impose a capacity constraint on the weights (but
see Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010, for a more recently developed model that predicts cue
competition without a capacity constraint). Importantly, this capacity restriction implies
that if the capacity restriction is reached, the cue weights are adjusted relative to the
importance of all other cues (Birnbaum, 1976; Busemeyer et al., 1993a).
To our knowledge, past research has not yet specified, nor tested a rule-based
learning model for human judgment spelling out how this cognitive capacity restriction
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affects knowledge updating. We implemented capacity restricted learning in our model by
restricting the updated cue weights to sum up to a capacity restriction r, ∑
i
|wt+1,i| ≤ r
(Busemeyer et al., 1993a).3 In each trial, the model updates the cue weights first using the
LMS rule, resulting in the unconstrained updated cue weights, vt,i. In case, the capacity
restriction is not reached, the unconstrained cue weights are used in the next trial,
wt+1,i = vt,i. In case, the capacity limit is reached, the cues are adjusted by the difference
between the summed cue weights still considered important after the update (i.e., they are
larger than 0) and the capacity restriction, divided by the number of non-zero weights p
(see Duchi, Shalev-Shwartz, Singer, & Chandra, 2008, and Appendix A for details).
βt,i =
[
|vt,i| − 1
p
∗
(∑
p
|vt,p| − r
)]+
(5)
where [x]+ is x for x > 0, else 0. Thus, the capacity model estimates a parameter for
the learning rate λ and the capacity constraint r. In a last step, the restricted weights βt,i
are multiplied by the sign function so that each non-zero weight keeps its initial direction.
wt+1,i = sgn(vt,i)βt,i (6)
Consider, for instance, a case in which capacity is restricted to r = 1 and the updated
cue weights are vt,∗ = [0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25]. In this example, each cue weight will be reduced
by 14 (1.5 - 1) = 0.125 and wt+1,∗ =[0.375 0.375 0.125 0.125]. Thus, increasing one cue
weight above the capacity limit reduces all cue weights by the same magnitude and, in
effect, decreases all other cue weights. Consider another case, in which one cue strongly
overshoots the capacity limit, for instance vt,∗ = [2 0.25 0.25 0.25]. Here, the smaller cue
weights are set to zero to adhere to the capacity restriction and only the highest cue weight
determines the reduction, (2 - 1) = 1, resulting in wt+1,∗=[1 0 0 0]. Thus, setting a
restriction on the absolute sum of weights can lead to ignoring the least important cues.
3 Restricting the absolute sum of cue weights transforms the linear regression model into a LASSO
regression.
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Accordingly, the capacity limit reduces how much cue weights are updated, which can
give rise to cue competition effects. These cue competition effects are most pronounced if
the capacity restriction falls below the optimal sum of weights because people will not
learn to weight the cues optimally and hence will not reach optimal performance. In case,
the capacity limit matches or somewhat exceeds the optimal sum of weights, the capacity
model will converge over the long run to the optimal weights, as do all other models.
Compared to the LMS rule, however, to what degree the cue weights are updated still
hinges upon the capacity limit preventing an overly strong adaptation of the cue weights in
response to high errors. For instance, consider a trial in which a participant’s judgment
(e.g. 10) was very far off from the correct response (e.g. 45). The LMS rule (similar to all
other models proposed here) assumes that the participant should strongly adjust all cue
weights in the direction of the error. This adjustment may in some trials lead astray and
the adjusted cue weights in the next trial are further away from the correct weights than
the original ones causing a decline in judgment accuracy. In contrast, the capacity
restriction limits this adjustment and therefore learning performance is more stable even
for high learning rates. However, learning proceeds similarly as in the LMS rule, if the
capacity limit strongly exceeds the optimal sum of weights.
LMS rule with attention learning (Attention)
Attentional mechanisms allow us to selectively process information and to prioritize
certain pieces of information, while ignoring less relevant cues (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; Le
Pelley et al., 2016). Learning research has emphasized the role of attentional processes in
associative learning (Denton & Kruschke, 2006; Kruschke, Kappenman, & Hetrick, 2005;
Le Pelley et al., 2016), category learning (Kalish & Kruschke, 2000; Kruschke, 1996), or
causal learning (Lachnit, Schultheis, König, Üngör, & Melchers, 2008). For instance,
evidence from the related field of category learning suggests that measures of attention
such as eye movements reflect the importance of cues in categorization decisions (Beesley,
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Nguyen, Pearson, & Le Pelley, 2015; Hoffman & Rehder, 2010; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005).
Recent research has identified the predictiveness of the cues, the salience of the cues, and
the value of the outcome as major determinants of attentional biases in associative learning
(Le Pelley et al., 2016). Similarly, categorization research has argued that people may shift
attention between different cues depending on their importance, but also in response to the
salience of single cues (Kalish & Kruschke, 2000; Kruschke, 1996).
Here, we implemented an attentional learning model that adapts the learning rate for
each cue weight over time by adjusting the cue weights proportionally to the correlation
between the current change in cue weights and recent changes in cue weights —a gain
adaptation learning mechanism (Sutton, 1992). As in the LMS rule, the judgment is in
every trial a linear additive function of the cue values and the cue weights, but instead of
assuming a global learning rate for all cues, the model considers a separate learning rate
αt,i for every cue i which can be learned over trials:
wt+1,i = wt,i + αt,i · xt,i · (yt − jˆt) (7)
with αt,i = ebt,i to keep the learning rates strictly in a positive range. Accordingly,
each cue weight is learned with a different learning speed. Specifically, these learning rates
are adjusted before any cue weight is updated by considering the global learning rate λ, the
salience of the cues, and a decaying memory trace, ht,i, that stores previous weight updates:
bt,i = bt−1,i + λ · xt,i · (yt − jˆt) · ht,i (8)
with an initial learning rate for the single cues b0 and the global learning rate λ
estimated as free parameters. Thus, the model updates knowledge faster about salient
cues, that is cues with high cue values, and cues that recently changed their weights,
reflecting that those cues may have been important to consider in recent trials. This stored
memory trace decays from the trial t to the next trial t+ 1 depending on the current
change in learning rate (Sutton, 1992). The degenerated trace ht,i is then updated with the
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current change in cue weights, αt,i · xt,i · (yt − jˆt), and, hence, the memory trace
accumulates recent changes in cue weights over time.
ht+1,i = ht,i
[
1− αt,i · x2t,i
]+
+ αt,i · xt,i · (yt − jˆt) (9)
Accordingly, how strongly the learning rate changes for a single cue in one trial
depends on the visual salience of the cue, judgment error on this trial, and the accumulated
knowledge about cues recently changing in importance.4
In sum, the attention model postulates that attention, as modelled by differences in
learning speed for different trials, modulates how fast people update their knowledge about
the cue weights. A higher learning rate reflects a higher attention towards this cue,
implying a stronger update of the cue weights. Attention flows towards errors caused by
salient and recently changing cues. As a result, if attention plays a major role during
relearning, people should adapt faster to changes in previously important cues and for cues
strongly changing their predictive weight.
Reanalysis: Comparing psychological learning models to the LMS rule
The proposed psychological learning models aim to incorporate key processes that
alter and limit people’s learning abilities in rule-based judgment. Compared to the LMS
rule, can those psychological mechanisms better capture how people learn to solve
rule-based judgment tasks? To understand which learning mechanism best describes and
predicts participants’ judgments in the experiment, we compared the models with two
model comparison criteria: the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) and
a generalization test (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000, see Appendix B for a more detailed
description). Whereas the BIC penalizes more complex models by accounting for the
4 Note that the product λxt,i · (yt − jˆt) reflects the update for each cue without assuming differences in
learning speed. As a result, the change in learning rate is proportional to the correlation between the
current change in cue weights and the accumulated recent changes in cue weights (Sutton, 1992).
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number of free parameters5, the generalization test measures to what degree the models
can also predict independent, unseen data, thereby taking the functional complexity of the
models into account. To calculate the BIC, we estimated each model’s parameter values
based on all training trials using maximum likelihood estimation. Based on the BIC, we
then derived the corresponding Bayesian Information weights, BICw, that yield the
probability that a given model is the best model within the model set given the data, that
is, the one that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler discrepancy (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004).
For the generalization test we used the cue weights from the last learning trial to
predict participants’ judgments for new objects. Next, we computed the deviances between
model predictions and participants’ judgments for all test trials, D, and similarly derived
deviance weights, Dw.
Descriptively, the average BIC is lower for the capacity and the attention model than
for the decay model and the LMS model with the capacity model reaching the lowest BIC
and the highest BICw (see Table 1). The decay model overall does not outperform the
LMS rule. Using the BICw to classify participants to the model with the best BIC suggests
that the majority of participants is best described by the capacity model and only a
minority is classified to the decay or the attention model. Also, the LMS rule and the
baseline model do not describe a substantial number of participants best.
Reflecting the results from training, the generalization test suggests an overall lower
D for the capacity and the attention model. Classifying participants to each model based
on the Dw again indicates that the capacity model best predicted judgments of the
majority of participants, whereas the decay model only described a minority of participants
best. The attention model best predicted a slightly larger number of participants compared
to the results based on BIC —mostly at the cost of the capacity model.
To gain more insight into the learning path, we compared the cue weights predicted
5 Using the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) instead of the BIC does not yield different results.
Therefore, we report only the BIC here.
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by each model to the weights of the rolling regression (Figure 1). These graphs suggest
that the decay model underestimates the importance of most cues for making a judgment.
In comparison, the capacity model in general catches the change in weights but slightly
overestimates the importance of the most predictive cue and underestimates the importance
of the least important cue. Finally, the attention model most precisely estimates the cue
weight of the most important cue and manages to match the rolling regressions’ cue
weights for the second and third most important cues at the end of the learning phase.
However, the cue weights deviate from the rolling regression in the first two thirds of the
learning phase and the model underestimates the weight for the least important cue.
In sum, the reanalysis suggested that a capacity-restricted learning model best
described rule-based learning, whereas a decay in learning speed or an attentional
mechanism fared less well. Compared with a stable rule-based judgment model at the end
of training, the capacity-restricted learning model also predicted judgments for new objects
fairly well.
Testing mechanisms of rule-based learning in a relearning experiment
The results from the reanalysis suggested that learning models incorporating
additional psychological mechanisms may better capture the learning path and also
improve predictions for unseen objects. In this reanalysis, participants only had to find out
once how important the cues are for making a judgment and the importance assigned to
different cues did not change over trials. The vast benefit of learning models is, however,
that they are able to predict how people learn to adapt their behavior to a new task.
Specifically, learning models predict how people should adapt their judgment policy in a
dynamic environment in which the cues’ importance for predicting a criterion changes. The
decay model predicts that people should adapt more slowly to a new task. In contrast, the
capacity model predicts that people will not reach optimal performance if the capacity
limit has been exceeded. Finally, the attention model suggests that attention focuses on
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cues that are highly salient, were previously relevant or implied a recent change in cue
weights. The learning models hence allow fine-grained predictions about how people should
change their judgment policy, if the underlying environment changes. In consequence, to
further evaluate the learning models and to test them rigorously against each other it is
necessary to contrast the models’ predictions in an experiment in which the importance of
the cues changes over trials and people have to adapt their judgment policy.
Therefore, we designed a relearning experiment in which 51 participants solved a
multiple-cue judgment task that changed over the course of learning. In the first half of the
learning phase, participants learned to predict the correct criteria based on four predictive
cues. After 200 trials, the least important cues gained importance for predicting the
criterion, whereas the two most important cues lost their importance.
Method
Participants. 51 participants (39 females, MAge = 22.1, SDAge = 3.6) were
recruited from the participant pool of the University of Basel. Participants received course
credit for their participation in the experiment. In addition, they could earn a
performance-dependent bonus (M = 6.2 CHF, SD = 2.9 CHF).
Design and material. The cover story in the multiple-cue judgment task asked
participants to judge how many small animals different comic figures, the Sonics, caught on
a scale from 0 to 50. Participants were presented with pictures of these Sonics that varied
on four different quantitative cues. The Sonics had different sizes of their ears and their
nose, and a different number of hairs and stripes on their shirt. Each cue could take on six
different ordered cue values ranging from 0 (e.g. a non-visible nose) to 5 (a very large
nose). These pictorial cues could be used to predict the criterion (the success of the Sonic).
To test how well the different learning models predict the learning path of the
participants, we changed during the judgment task how these cues had to be combined to
form the judgment criterion. Specifically, in the first 200 trials of the judgment task the
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criterion was a linear, additive function of the cues, y = 4x1 + 3x2 + 2x3 + x4. After 200
trials, the task environment suddenly changed so that the two most important cues lost
their predictive power, whereas the two least important cues gained importance,
y = 4x3 + 6x4. To select this particular task combination, we used in a first step the
median parameters from the reanalysis to predict learning performance as well as the
adaptation to a new task environment across a range of task combinations. We selected the
task combination that best allowed us to make distinct predictions for the learning models.
Within this task combination, we next constructed a presentation sequence from all
possible items that maximized the possibility to discriminate between the learning models.
To generate this sequence, we randomly drew 1000 learning sequences, each consisting of
400 items, and estimated the models’ parameters for this sequence. We finally selected the
presentation sequence that maximized differences in model predictions across the whole
learning phase as well as for the first 50 trials of the relearning phase.
For each participant, the cues x1 to x4 were randomly assigned to the pictorial cues
(e.g., ears or nose). Higher cue values, however, were always associated with more salient
pictorial features. For instance, a cue value of zero corresponded to a Sonic without stripes
on the belly and a cue value of five to a Sonic with five stripes on the belly. Likewise, a cue
value of zero on the cue ’nose’ corresponded to a Sonic without a (visible) nose, whereas a
Sonic with a cue value of five had a big nose.
Procedure. The experiment consisted of 400 learning trials, divided into 16
learning blocks with 25 trials each. In each trial, participants first estimated the criterion
on a scale from 0 to 50 and afterwards received feedback about their own answer, the
correct outcome, and the points they earned. After 200 learning trials (i.e., after the eighth
block), the task environment changed and participants had to relearn the importance of
the cues. Participants were explicitly informed in the beginning of the experiment about a
potential change in the task. Yet they were not informed when the change would happen
but had to infer that the change occurred from the feedback they received. Specifically, the
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instructions highlighted that "how you could best solve the judgment task may change
during the experiment." After introducing the comic figures and their features, participants
were again told that "how you could use the features [of the comic figure] to judge the
comic figure may change over time".
To motivate participants to achieve a high judgment accuracy, they could earn points
in each trial depending on how much their judgment j deviated from the correct criterion y:
Points = 20− (j − y)
2
7.625 (10)
This function was truncated so that participants could win at most 20 points in each
trial and could not lose any points. In addition, if participants reached more than 80% of
the points in the last two learning blocks of each task (learning block 8 and 16), they
received an additional bonus of 3 CHF. Participants were informed that we selected two
learning blocks in advance for paying out the bonus, but we did not tell them which blocks
we chose.
Results
Learning performance. The learning performance suggested that participants on
average adapted to the change in the task environment (Figure 2). Descriptively, judgment
error, measured as the root mean square deviation (RMSD) between participants’
judgments and the criterion, dropped from the first learning block (M = 9.1, SD = 1.9,
with each block including 25 items) to the eighth block, M = 6.2, SD = 2.0, t(50) = -9.0, d
= -1.45, p < 0.001 (d calculated using an effect size based on the change score for repeated
measures, Morris & DeShon, 2002). When the environment changed after the eighth block,
judgment error suddenly increased, M = 10.6, SD = 2.3, t(50) = 12.0, d = 1.92, p < 0.001,
but dropped again until the end of the experiment, M = 7.4, SD = 3.6, t(50) = -7.1, d =
-0.88, p < 0.001. Inspecting individual learning paths indicated that participants varied
strongly in the degree to which they successfully adapted to the change in task
RULES IN JUDGMENT 23
environment. Compared to the first eight blocks of the experiments, judgment performance
varied more strongly between participants after the task environment changed. Whereas
some participants quickly achieved a high judgment accuracy, other participants did not
show any improvement in judgment accuracy. This qualitative pattern indicates that how
people learn to adapt to a change of the task environment may vary between participants
and may suggest different underlying learning mechanisms.
Average performance of the learning models. To understand which learning
mechanism best describes and predicts participants’ judgments over the experiment, we
compared each model’s performance based on the BIC and based on the generalization test
(see Appendix B for a more detailed description). For the BIC, we estimated each model’s
parameters based on all trials in the experiment and calculated the BIC weights (see
Appendix C for model parameters). To consider as well how accurately all models predict
new data, we further performed a generalization test (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000).
Specifically, we first estimated each models’ parameters based on participants’ judgments
in the first 200 trials. In a next step, we used the obtained parameters to predict
participants’ judgments for all learning trials, that is the learning models continued to
learn in the second half of the experiment. As a measure of model fit, we determined the
deviance D based on the predictions for the second half of the experiment. Table 2
summarizes the model fits, the relative performance of all models within the set of
considered models (BICw and Dw) as well as the absolute fit between model predictions
and participants’ judgments (RMSD).
Similar to the results of the reanalysis, the capacity and the attention model possess
a lower BIC than the decay model or the LMS rule with the capacity model outperforming
all other models. The decay model describes judgments slightly better than the LMS rule.
But can the capacity model also predict how well participants adapt to the change in task
environment? Matching the results based on BIC, the capacity model best predicts
participants’ judgments in the second half of the experiment. The LMS rule and the decay
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model also outperform a baseline model in predicting how participants adapt to the change
in task environment, but now the decay model fares worse than the LMS rule. More
importantly, the relative advantage of the attention model vanishes in generalization.
Specifically, the D of the attention model is similar to the D of the LMS rule and the decay
model indicating that the attention model has problems to predict how participants relearn
the task. In fact, the model generated a higher D than the baseline model for 23 of the 51
participants and the RMSD between model predictions and participants’ judgments
suggests a stronger increase for the attention model than for the other models compared to
fitting.6
To more closely investigate to what extent the learning path of the learning models
agrees with the average learning path of all participants, we generated the predicted RMSD
in each learning block based on each model’s predictions and the models’ implied standard
deviation. Figure 3 depicts for each learning block the average judgment error of all
participants (blue lines) as well as the average judgment error predicted by each model
(black lines, in columns), separately for model estimation and generalization (in rows). Red
diamonds illustrate the absolute difference between the model’s implied learning path and
participants’ learning path, averaged across participants. Light gray lines show the model
predicted judgment error for each single participant. Early in training, the LMS rule, the
decay, and the attention model on average underestimate how well the average participant
adapts to the judgment task, but this difference strongly decreases in later learning blocks
(Figure 3, upper row). In contrast, the capacity model captures quite well the average
learning path in most learning blocks, but makes slightly more errors on average in the first
and last learning blocks.
Focusing more on the variation in individual model predictions, the graphs based on
estimation illustrate that predicted judgment error is more variable for the LMS rule and
6 For 12 participants the attention model generated extremely high D that we restricted to D = 10’000. In
addition, model-implied cue weights in generalization were bound to the scale between -10 and 10.
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the decay model than for the capacity or the attention model across all learning blocks.
Specifically, the capacity model suggests for most participants a steady learning path in the
first half of the experiment as well as an improvement after the task environment changed
with (mostly) faster learning in the first learning blocks. The LMS rule and the decay
model instead allow for the possibility that after the task environment changed, judgment
error does not much decrease even after several learning blocks. In addition, both models
propose that judgment error strongly increases in a few learning blocks (e.g. in learning
block 4) —a pattern that is neither as pronounced in participants (compare Figure 2) nor
picked up by the capacity model. Finally, the attention model describes a slower learning
path in the first learning phase compared to the capacity model as well as participants’
learning path. Furthermore, similar to the decay model it allows a strong increase in
judgment error even after several learning blocks in the relearning phase (learning block 14
and 15). Although judgment error also increases for a few participants in learning block 14,
the increase in block 15 is less pronounced in participants.
In generalization, the overall predictive performance of all models drops and
differences in model implied learning paths are even more pronounced (Figure 3, lower
row): Whereas the capacity model mostly predicts a steady improvement for the second
half, the LMS rule and —to an even stronger degree —the decay model are more likely to
predict a large amount of judgment errors. Finally, the attention model predicts larger
judgment errors in the last 200 trials and the absolute difference between learning paths
suggests a rather strong increase in mismatch. Particularly, the attention model
emphasizes that judgment error may strongly increase for some participants and predicts
for a substantial number of participants larger judgment errors late in learning
(particularly in block 15). This might have contributed to its inability to predict the
learning path of individual participants.
Taken together, all learning models incorporating an additional psychological learning
mechanism outperformed the LMS rule in terms of BIC, but only the capacity model keeps
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this advantage in generalization. Average model fits suggest that the capacity model overall
describes the learning path best. Yet, the high variability in model predictions as well as in
learning performance of individual participants make it likely that different learning
mechanisms account better for different subgroups of individuals. Accordingly, in a next
step we assessed which learning mechanism best describes the majority of participants and
how individuals classified to different learning mechanisms differ in their overall learning
path.
Learning path for individual participants. To identify whether the learning
mechanisms best described different subgroups of individuals, we classified participants to
the different learning models based upon the relative performance of those models (that is,
the BICw or the Dw in the generalization test, respectively). Reflecting the results from the
reanalysis reported above, the classification based on the BICw indicated that the capacity
model described the majority of participants best (66.7 %) and only a minority of
participants were better described by the decay model (25.5 %), the attention model (5.9
%), or the LMS rule (2.0 %). A classification based on the Dw suggested similarly that
most participants (45.1 %) were classified as best predicted by the capacity model.
Further, some participants were classified as best predicted by the decay model (15.7 %),
the LMS rule (9.8 %) or the attention model (13.7 %), respectively. Yet, a substantial
number of participants were classified to the baseline model (15.7 %) indicating that the
learning models are prone to overfitting the data.
Figure 4 displays the learning path for participants best described by each model
(blue lines, in columns) as well as the average judgment error predicted by each model
(black lines, in columns), separately for model fitting and generalization (in rows). Light
gray lines show the model predicted judgment error for each single participant.
Considering first the learning path for model classifications based on BIC weights (Figure
4, upper row), the learning models seem to capture different learning patterns best.
Specifically, the decay model proposes predominantly that performance steadily improves
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in the first half of the experiment for participants best fit by the model, but judgment error
only slowly decreases in the second half indicating that those participants may only slowly
adapt to the changing task environment. The capacity model similarly proposes a steady
improvement during the first half, but in comparison predicts a faster decline in judgment
error after the change indicating a more successful relearning of the judgment task. In
contrast, the attention model captures the learning path of participants best for whom it
predicts only slow improvements in the first half of learning as well as problems in adapting
to the change in task environment, as indicated by even a slight increase in judgment error
from learning block 9 to 12. Finally, the participant classified to the LMS rule displays a
learning path that systematically deviates from the learning path implied by the model.
The qualitative differences in model predictions between the decay and the capacity model
are even more pronounced for participants classified based on Dw obtained from the
generalization test (Figure 4, lower row). Whereas the decay model predicts for most
participants a high judgment error after the task environment changed, the capacity model
predicts a more successful learning path for most participants.
Figure 5 illustrates how the model-implied cue weights change over the course of the
experiment compared to cue weights estimated from a rolling regression. Inferred cue
weights were predicted based on the learning parameters estimated on the first 200 learning
trials. The upper row shows implied average cue weights for all participants, the lower row
shows implied cue weights only for those participants best predicted by each model. This
graph suggests that on average the decay model predicts for every cue a rather slow change
in cue weights and particularly underestimates how fast participants relearn to assign a
higher importance to cue 3 and cue 4. In comparison, the capacity model overestimates
how fast participants react to a change in the environment, predicting an almost immediate
detection of the most important cue in the second phase of the experiment and a quick
suppression of the no longer predictive cues. Finally, the attention model relearns cue 4
slightly more slowly than the capacity model, but similarly overestimates its importance.
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In addition, it inhibits more strongly the previously important cues than the capacity
model does.
Taken together, the capacity model best described and predicted how most
participants learned to adapt their judgments over trials suggesting on average a steady
adaptation to the change in task environment. The decay model fared best in describing
and predicting those participants who more slowly detect this change and in turn show a
delayed improvement in judgment accuracy.
Does a combination of psychological mechanisms outperform the single
process models? It is possible that the psychological mechanisms we proposed do not
act in isolation, but a learning model incorporating, for instance, attentional learning as
well as a decay mechanism may outperform the isolated learning mechanisms. To account
for this possibility, we formulated learning models combining two out of the three proposed
psychological mechanisms. We also specified one "full model" relying on decay, a capacity
constraint, as well as attentional learning (for the specification of the full model see
Appendix D, for BICs and D see Appendix E). Next, we calculated how likely each model
is the best model within this candidate set in terms of BICw or Dw. Overall, this
comparison suggested that a model combining a capacity restriction and a decay possesses
a higher BICw = 0.62 (SD = 0.46) than a model assuming attentional learning and decay
(BICw = 0.06, SD = 0.22), a model assuming attentional learning and a capacity
restriction (BICw = 0.22, SD = 0.38) or the full model (BICw = 0.1, SD = 0.28). Similarly,
Dw were slightly higher for the model combining a capacity restriction and decay (Dw =
0.37, SD = 0.48) than for a model assuming attentional learning and decay (Dw = 0.29,
SD = 0.46), a model assuming attentional learning and a capacity restriction (Dw = 0.1,
SD = 0.29), or the full model (Dw = 0.24, SD = 0.42). Overall, this result suggests that
attentional learning only plays a minor role in learning compared to a capacity restriction
and a decay in learning speed.
Does a combination of capacity-restricted learning and a decay in learning speed
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describe and predict participant’s judgments better than all of the single mechanisms
alone? Thus, in a second step, we estimated to what degree the combined model is
preferred compared to the isolated mechanisms using BICw or Dw. Overall, this analyses
yielded mixed results. In describing participants’ judgments across all experimental trials,
the combined model (BICw = 0.6, SD = 0.44) outperformed the decay model (BICw = 0.2,
SD = 0.36), the capacity model, (BICw = 0.15, SD = 0.32), and the attention model
(BICw = 0.05, SD = 0.2). In generalization, however, the capacity model (Dw = 0.48, SD
= 0.5) better predicted judgments compared to the decay model (Dw = 0.27, SD = 0.39),
the attention model (Dw = 0.13, SD = 0.33), or the combined model (Dw = 0.13, SD =
0.27). One potential reason why the complex model does not fare too well in predicting
new judgments is that those models may adjust to flexibly to participants’ learning in the
first phase and are, hence, less robust to variations in the learning path in the second
phase. Taken together, these results suggests that assuming only capacity-restricted
learning is more parsimonious than considering a combination of different psychological
mechanisms and might be the more robust model in predicting new independent behavior.
Robustness check. In the preceding analysis, all learning models included the
strong assumption that participants make the first judgment without considering any cues
or cue values, that is, the starting weights in the first trial were set to [0 0 0 0 j] with j
reflecting a starting bias corresponding to the intercept in a regression model. It is possible
that this assumption may have biased our analysis and another learning model may yield a
better performance if we relax this assumption. To control for this possibility, we varied
the starting weights systematically from assuming that all cues equally contribute to the
judgment in the first trial but not the bias (0 % bias) to no contribution of the cues to the
judgment (100 % bias corresponding to our previous analysis) in steps of 12.5 % bias. The
weights in the first trial were thus calculated as
wn =
j ∗ (100%− b)∑
xn
(11)
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with b varying the percentage of bias.7 If the starting weights biased our analysis
towards the capacity model and another model, for instance the attention model, performs
better considering a different set of starting weights, we would expect that this competitor
shows consistently a higher BICw (or Dw, respectively) than the capacity model for
different sets of starting weights. A mere reduction in BICw for the capacity model,
however, could also result because we maximized the possibility to discriminate between
models using the starting weights with a 100 % bias. Thus, the ability to discriminate
between the models may be lower for different starting values and the reduction in BICw is
not a sufficient indicator for a worse model performance.
Figure 6 displays how the average BICw (left panel) and Dw (right panel) for each
model (separate lines: Baseline, LMS rule, Decay, Capacity, and Attention model) vary as
a function of the percentage of bias. For both BICw and Dw, the pattern suggests that the
weights for the capacity model increase with a higher percentage of bias. In contrast, with
a lower bias the BICw for the LMS rule and the attention model increase. In generalization,
the Dw for the LMS rule and the baseline model increase similarly with a lower bias. Still,
the capacity model possesses a higher BICw and a higher Dw across all starting weights we
used. In sum, although the discrimination between the models varies with the bias, the
advantage of the capacity model appears to be robust against variations in starting weights.
Contrasting capacity constrained learning with a Bayesian Learning
model. The current work mainly focussed on evaluating how well different psychological
mechanisms supplementing the LMS rule fare within an updating process that hinges on
gradient descent learning. Our work shows that within the family of LMS rule models the
capacity-restricted LMS was best in describing the observed learning process.
Alternatively, it has been proposed that updating of the cues could follow a Bayesian
7 We conducted as well a robustness check varying the intercept in the probe, xt,∗=
[
xt,1 ... xt,n k
]
with k =[1, 2, 5]. Results do not suggest that another LMS model systematically outperforms the capacity
model if a different value for the intercept is assumed.
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learning process (Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010) or that people may learn the associations
between specific patterns of cue and criterion values (Busemeyer, Byun, Delosh, &
McDaniel, 1997; Kruschke, 1992). However, it is beyond the focus of the present work to
test the capacity-restricted model against a variety of alternative frameworks and learning
models. To evaluate the predictive accuracy of the capacity-restricted LMS rule we thought
it would be beneficial to compare it to the Bayesian approach. Thus, is a
capacity-restricted LMS rule a viable competitor for Bayesian learning models? To
compare capacity-restricted learning with Bayesian models, we implemented the Bayesian
Linear Filter (Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010) using a version with 3 parameters (σ0 for the
diagonal elements of the covariance matrix of the prior distribution, σ for the diagonal
elements of the covariance matrix of validity changes, and σy as the standard deviation
around predicted judgments). Comparing the performance of the Bayesian Linear Filter
with the capacity model suggests that the Bayesian Linear Filter on average describes the
learning process better than the capacity model (BIC = 2693, SD = 194 vs. capacity
model: BIC = 2715, SD = 182), but does not predict as successfully as the Capacity model
how people adapt to a change in task environment (D = 1458, SD = 165 vs. capacity
model: D = 1439, SD = 180). Likewise, considering the relative evidence for the Bayesian
Linear Filter, as expressed by the BICw and Dw, suggests that the Bayesian Linear Filter
performs better at describing the learning path (BICw = 0.73, SD = 0.44), but the
evidence does not favor one over the other model in generalization (Dw = 0.53, SD =
0.49). More fine-grained analyses of the cue weights indicated that the models predict
similar adjustments of the cue weights as a function of learning. For instance, both models
predict a rapid change in importance for the previously least important cue (Cue 4), but do
not capture the slower learning of the second least important cue (Cue 3). Classifying
participants suggested that those participants are better predicted by the capacity model
who quickly learn to focus on the most important cue after the task changed and efficiently
suppress the cue weights for the least important cues. Taken together, these results suggest
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that the capacity constrained LMS rule might be a suitable competitor for Bayesian
Learning models.
General Discussion
Weighing information according to its importance has been deemed one of the core
competences in human judgment. However, how people learn these weights has received
less attention. The predominant model to describe the learning process, the LMS rule,
assumes that people will be able to learn the optimal cue weights when receiving
appropriate feedback —an assumption that contradicts prior evidence showing that human
learning depends on the relative weight of the cues (Busemeyer et al., 1993b) and on
average slows down when people have to adapt to a new task environment (Betsch,
Brinkmann, Fiedler, & Breining, 1999; Betsch, Haberstroh, Glöckner, Haar, & Fiedler,
2001; Bröder & Schiffer, 2006; Rieskamp, 2006). Still, little research has tried to capture
how people learn the importance of cue weights within a formal modeling approach (for
exceptions see Kelley & Busemeyer, 2008; Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010). In our study, we
aimed to fill this gap by a) systematically comparing the LMS rule to human learning in
judgment and b) by implementing three additional psychological mechanisms into the LMS
rule that have explained deviations from optimal learning in related research areas: a decay
of the learning rate, a capacity restriction, and attentional learning.
Overall, we found that adding those psychological learning mechanisms better
described the learning process than the pure LMS rule. In the reanalysis, all extended LMS
learning models predicted judgments more accurately than the pure LMS rule. To tease
the psychological learning mechanisms apart, we designed an experiment assessing how well
people relearn a task after the judgment environment changed making it necessary that
participants adjusted the learned cue weights to accurately predict the criterion. In this
experiment, however, only the capacity model outperformed the LMS model and the
baseline model in both fitting the whole learning phase and predicting learning in a
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generalization test. These results suggest that considering psychological constraints within
optimal learning algorithms may help to better understand how people learn to solve
judgment problems and that —within the class of LMS model —a capacity constraint likely
best explains the systematic differences between human performance and an optimal LMS
learning algorithm. Still, Bayesian learning models may provide an alternative approach.
Capacity restrictions in learning
Why is there a benefit for the capacity model over all other LMS models? The
capacity model has been motivated by research on capacity limits in judgment and decision
making and cue competition (Birnbaum, 1976; Busemeyer et al., 1993a; Busemeyer et al.,
1993b; Juslin et al., 2008). It assumes that a capacity limit restricts how much importance
people assign to the cues. This slows down updating of the cue weights in each single step
and allows for the possibility that people do not learn the optimal weights even after a long
time. Further, increases in one weight imply decreases in other weights.
The version we proposed here assumes that if the capacity limit is exceeded all cues
weights are reduced by the same amount, setting weights to zero for which this
substraction would change the predictive direction. This implies that people will have
problems to track cue weights, if the number of cues increases. One prediction that follows
from this, is, for instance, that problems with one predictive cue should be learned at a
faster speed than problems with five predictive cues if the learning rate is high.
If the capacity restriction does not allow to consider all predictive cues, however,
strict capacity limitations may change from trial to trial which cue is considered most
important. Consequently, a lower capacity limit can induce a more inconsistent weighting
of the cues and thereby decrease judgment consistency – a finding in line with previous
work suggesting that constraints in working memory capacity may limit how consistently
people pursue a strategy at the end of learning (Hoffmann et al., 2014). Finally, compared
to previous evidence suggesting that the less valid cue suffers more from cue competition
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than the highly valid cue (an asymmetric effect Busemeyer et al., 1993a), our model
proposes that both cues are affected by cue competition to the same degree (a symmetric
effect). Yet, previous work also suggests that cue competition effects may be less
pronounced in judgment than they are in related domains. Specifically, Speekenbrink and
Shanks (2010) only observed cue competition effects in a minority of participants and a
model incorporating competitive effects only described a few participants best. Further
research may specify the conditions under which cue competition effects are likely to occur
in judgment.
Interestingly, the model proposes that the capacity restriction may possess an
adaptive value. Specifically, in the LMS rule high learning rates are not always beneficial
because the cue weights can strongly change in a single trial. In our study, this
overadaptation led the LMS rule to predict high error in some blocks, whereas the majority
of participants did not adjust their predictions to the same degree. A capacity limit close
to the optimal sum of weights limits the possibility that people update the cue weights too
strongly, which in turn prevents overly high errors during training and as a result may also
enable higher learning rates.
Does the capacity model capture judgment phenomena beyond learning of linear,
additive functions with positive cue-criterion relationships? All LMS models considered
here are limited to learning linear, additive functions and do not postulate in advance any
prior relationship between the cues and the criterion. As a result, the capacity model would
learn functions with a negative correlation between each cue and the criterion at the same
speed as positive relationships. However, past research has shown that participants solve
judgment problems including only positive relationships between the cues and the criterion
faster than judgment problems with negative or mixed relationships (Rolison et al., 2012).
One way to capture this phenomenon, could be to assume positive starting values of the
cue weights or to make more sophisticated assumptions about the prior beliefs people may
have regarding the cue-criterion relations (for recent approaches to this problem see Lucas
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et al., 2015; Schulz, Tenenbaum, Duvenaud, Speekenbrink, & Gershman, 2017).
In addition, the current version of the capacity model only considers linear additive
relationships. In the present task this posed no problem, as the task we used did not
require learning nonlinear effects. Although people are usually biased to learn positive
linear functions (for a review Lucas et al., 2015), they are able to learn more complex
relationships (Bott & Heit, 2004; Mellers, 1980). Thus, it seems important to consider how
our model could be extended to describe learning processes of nonlinear relationships
between cues and a criterion. One possibility would be to include nonlinear terms (for
instance quadratic or multiplicative ones) as further predictors. In this case, centering and
scaling these predictors should be considered because the capacity limit in combination
with high correlations between linear and nonlinear predictors may punish nonlinear
predictors too harshly. Thus, how a capacity limit may influence the ability to learn
nonlinear effects would be an important area for future research.
Slower learning with more experience
A common finding in the learning literature is that people are able to relearn a task
—albeit more slowly than they learned the original task (Betsch et al., 1999; Betsch et al.,
2001; Bröder & Schiffer, 2006; Dudycha et al., 1973; Peterson et al., 1965). Overall, in the
second study people were slower to learn the cue weights after the change than in the first
learning phase. However, there were large individual differences in the overall pattern of
how people adapt to a change in task environment. Whereas some people rather quickly
adapted to the task environment, others had problems with relearning the task. These
results resonate well with the findings by Speekenbrink and Shanks (2010) who also found
large individual difference in the ability to adapt to changes in cue validity. However, in
both studies only a minority of participants was best described and predicted by the decay
model suggesting that a pure slowing of learning over time is not enough to capture how
people learn each cues’ importance.
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One reason why decay only played a minor role in our experiment could be that we
informed participants about a potential change in the task environment and introduced a
rather salient shift in the cues’ importance. This shift in task environment resulted in a
strong reduction in judgment accuracy in the ninth block which may have clearly signaled
to participants that they should change their judgment policy. In this vein, previous
research suggests that learning rates depend on whether people expect a change or not. For
instance, Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, and Rushworth (2007) found on average higher
learning rates in variable environments including a lot of changes than in stable
environments in which no change occurred. Accordingly, including a mechanism allowing
for decay in the learning rate may gain importance when changes occur gradually and are
unexpected.
Attentional learning
Attentional learning has been considered an important mechanism in associative
learning (Denton & Kruschke, 2006; Kruschke et al., 2005; Le Pelley et al., 2016) and past
research in fields closely related to judgment research has repeatedly provided evidence for
the idea that attention influences learning processes (Le Pelley et al., 2016). Furthermore,
attentional shifts have been used to explain learning phenomena such as blocking (Kruschke
et al., 2005), overshadowing (Denton & Kruschke, 2006) and they may also explain cue
competition (Kruschke, 2001). Thus, attentional learning seemed a promising candidate to
explain how people deviate from optimal learning. Here, we implemented an attentional
learning mechanism that adjusts the learning rate for each cue weight over time, thereby
considering changes in recent trials and difference in visual salience (Sutton, 1992).
On average, the attention model performed quite well when fitting participants’ data
(second runner up). However, on the individual level only a small number of participants
were classified to the model. The model also did not perform well in the generalization test
indicating strong overfitting. These misfits are potentially caused by an overly strong
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tuning of the learning rates to the judgment problem and may result in an inability to
predict future judgments. Possibly, limiting the learning rates could make the model more
resistant to overfitting and better suited to explain learning in judgment problems.
Further frameworks for learning multiple cue judgments
In the present work we focused on evaluating psychological constraints within the
framework of rule-based models learning from feedback. Assuming that people rely on a
linear additive judgment rule, the proposed rule-based learning models update the cue
weights based on the difference between the judgment and external feedback. We took this
approach to (1) be able to investigate learning of cue validities in a task where people have
been shown to learn the appropriate function and (2) to identify the psychological
mechanisms that need to be assumed to explain how people learn cue weights within a
single modelling framework.
However, further successful frameworks that describe how people learn to make
judgments exist. For one, it has been argued recently that human learning processes may
be better described by Bayesian learning mechanisms. In this vein, Speekenbrink and
Shanks (2010) proposed a Bayesian model of how people learn the cue weights in a linear
judgment rule, which described participants’ judgments better than the LMS rule. In our
study, the Bayesian Linear Filter on average successfully described and predicted human
judgments, too. Comparing the Bayesian Linear Filter to the capacity model suggested
that the Bayesian Linear Filter fares somewhat better than the capacity model in
describing participants’ judgments. However, both models were equally successful at
predicting generalization performance, yielding similar predictions for how people should
weigh the cues within our relearning design. These results suggest that the capacity model
may be a suitable competitor to further contrast with different updating rules. Moreover,
the capacity model specifies a mechanism to explain why the weights people assign to cues
may deviate from optimal cue validities, which is grounded in psychological theory.
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Assuming a psychological mechanism such as the capacity limit has the advantage that it
allows predicting under which conditions learning of cue validities depends on further
factors such as the number of predictive cues. In contrast, it seems less clear how a similar
mechanism could be incorporated into a Bayesian learning model. Thus, one way to tease
the models apart could be to vary how difficult it is to detect the predictive cues.
Besides the Bayesian approach, association-based approaches might also do well in
describing the learning process for judgment tasks. In particular, it has been argued that
people may learn the associations between specific patterns of cue and criterion values,
instead of solving judgment tasks by relying on explicit linear rules. In this vein, the
associative learning model (ALM, Busemeyer et al., 1997) has been shown to describe
people’s performance in a variety of judgment tasks well and to outperform a simple LMS
model (Kelley & Busemeyer, 2008; Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010). In category learning,
the predominant model is the exemplar-based neural network ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992)
that could be adapted to describe learning in judgment tasks. Similar to the LMS rule,
ALM and ALCOVE are, however, unable to predict cue competition effects (Busemeyer
et al., 1993b). Nevertheless, our current work cannot and did not aim to rule out these
models, but identifies a more promising competitor model than the original LMS rule
within the framework of LMS models. Beyond the question which of those frameworks
describes learning processes best and in which task environments, future research may seek
to embed similar psychological constraints across different frameworks to test their
psychological plausibility.
Lastly, recent approaches to function learning have suggested that rule- and
similarity-based approaches can be integrated within a Gaussian process model and have
highlighted inductive biases people have for different types of functions (Lucas et al., 2015)
as well as the compositional nature of human function learning (Schulz et al., 2017). This
work has made an important contribution to understanding how people can construct
highly complex representations from simple basis functions, but did not focus on distinct
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learning mechanisms. Thus, understanding how cue weights are learned and the
psychological mechanisms describing the learning process may complement this work.
Conclusion
In sum, we aimed to investigate the psychological mechanisms constraining how
people learn to weigh different pieces of information in multiple cue judgment tasks. All
three mechanisms improved how well the LMS rule described the learning process, but
including a capacity restriction matched human performance most closely. These results
suggest that limited cognitive resources that confine knowledge updating may cause
deviations from optimal learning and highlight that considering psychological constraints
within learning models may inform our understanding of human behavior.
RULES IN JUDGMENT 40
References
Anderson, N. H. (1971). Integration theory and attitude change. Psychological Review,
78 (3), 171–206. doi:10.1037/h0030834
Awh, E., Vogel, E. K., & Oh, S. H. (2006). Interactions between attention and working
memory. Neuroscience, 139 (1), 201–208. doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2005.08.023
Beesley, T., Nguyen, K. P., Pearson, D., & Le Pelley, M. E. (2015). Uncertainty and
predictiveness determine attention to cues during human associative learning. The
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 68 (11), 2175–2199.
doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1009919
Behrens, T. E. J., Woolrich, M. W., Walton, M. E., & Rushworth, M. F. S. (2007).
Learning the value of information in an uncertain world. Nature Neuroscience, 10 (9),
1214–1221. doi:10.1038/nn1954
Betsch, T., Brinkmann, B. J., Fiedler, K., & Breining, K. (1999). When prior knowledge
overrules new evidence: Adaptive use of decision strategies and the role of behavioral
routines. Swiss Journal of Psychology, 58 (3), 151–160.
doi:10.1024//1421-0185.58.3.151
Betsch, T., Haberstroh, S., Glöckner, A., Haar, T., & Fiedler, K. (2001). The effects of
routine strength on adaptation and information search in recurrent decision making.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 84 (1), 23–53.
doi:10.1006/obhd.2000.2916
Birnbaum, M. H. (1976). Intuitive numerical prediction. The American Journal of
Psychology, 89 (3), 417–429. doi:10.2307/1421615
Bott, L., & Heit, E. (2004). Nonmonotonic extrapolation in function learning. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30 (1), 38–50.
doi:10.1037/0278-7393.30.1.38
Brehmer, B. (1994). The psychology of linear judgement models. Acta Psychologica,
87 (2-3), 137–154. doi:10.1016/0001-6918(94)90048-5
RULES IN JUDGMENT 41
Bröder, A., & Schiffer, S. (2006). Adaptive flexibility and maladaptive routines in selecting
fast and frugal decision strategies. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 32 (4), 904–918. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.32.4.904
Busemeyer, J. R., Byun, E., Delosh, E. L., & McDaniel, M. A. M. (1997). Learning
functional relations based on experience with input-output pairs by humans and
artificial neural networks. In Lamberts K. & D. Shanks (Eds.), Knowledge, concepts
and categories (pp. 408–437). Cambridge, MA, US: MIT Press.
Busemeyer, J. R., Myung, I. J., & McDaniel, M. A. (1993a). Cue competition effects:
Theoretical implications for adaptive network learning Models. Psychological Science,
4 (3), 196–202. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00487.x
Busemeyer, J. R., Myung, I. J., & McDaniel, M. A. M. (1993b). Cue competition effects:
Empirical tests of adaptive network learning models. Psychological Science, 4 (3),
190–195. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00486.x
Busemeyer, J. R., & Wang, Y.-M. (2000). Model Comparisons and Model Selections Based
on Generalization Criterion Methodology. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 44,
171–189. doi:10.1006/jmps.1999.1282
Cooksey, R. W. (1996). Judgment analysis: Theory, methods and applications. San Diego,
CA: Academic Press.
Denton, S. E., & Kruschke, J. K. (2006). Attention and salience in associative blocking.
Learning & Behavior, 34 (3), 285–304. doi:10.3758/BF03192884
Duchi, J., Shalev-Shwartz, S., Singer, Y., & Chandra, T. (2008). Efficient projections onto
the l1-ball for learning in high dimensions. In Proceedings of the 25th international
conference on Machine learning (pp. 272–279).
Dudycha, A. L., Dumoff, I. G., & Dudycha, L. W. (1973). Choice behavior in dynamic
environments. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 9, 328–338.
RULES IN JUDGMENT 42
Einhorn, H. J., Kleinmuntz, D. N., & Kleinmuntz, B. (1979). Linear regression and
process-tracing models of judgment. Psychological Review, 86 (5), 465–485.
doi:10.1037//0033-295X.86.5.465
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction
to Theory and Research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Gluck, M. A., & Bower, G. H. (1988). From conditioning to category learning: an adaptive
network model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 117 (3), 227–247.
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.117.3.227
Graves, L. M., & Karren, R. J. (1992). Interviewer decision processes and effectiveness: An
experimental policy-capturing investigation. Personnel Psychology, 45, 313–340.
doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.1992.tb00852.x
Hastie, T., Tibshirani, R., & Wainwright, M. (2015). Statistical learning with sparsity: the
lasso and generalizations. New York, NY: CRC Press.
Hirschmüller, S., Egloff, B., Nestler, S., & Back, M. D. (2013). The dual lens model: A
comprehensive framework for understanding self–other agreement of personality
judgments at zero acquaintance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
104 (2), 335–353. doi:10.1037/a0030383
Hoffman, A. B., & Rehder, B. (2010). The costs of supervised classification: The effect of
learning task on conceptual flexibility. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
139 (2), 319–340. doi:10.1037/a0019042
Hoffmann, J. A., von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2013). Deliberation’s blindsight: How
cognitive load can improve judgments. Psychological Science, 24 (6), 869–879.
doi:10.1177/0956797612463581
Hoffmann, J. A., von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2014). Pillars of judgment: How
memory abilities affect performance in rule-based and exemplar-based judgments.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143 (6), 2242–2261.
doi:10.1037/a0037989
RULES IN JUDGMENT 43
Hoffmann, J. A., von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2016). Similar task features shape
judgment and categorization processes. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 42 (8), 1193–1217. doi:10.1037/xlm0000241
Juslin, P., Karlsson, L., & Olsson, H. (2008). Information integration in multiple cue
judgment: A division of labor hypothesis. Cognition, 106 (1), 259–298.
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.02.003
Kalish, M. L., & Kruschke, J. K. (2000). The role of attention shifts in the categorization
of continuous dimensioned stimuli. Psychological Research, 64 (2), 105–116.
doi:10.1007/s004260000028
Kelley, H., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2008). A comparison of models for learning how to
dynamically integrate multiple cues in order to forecast continuous criteria. Journal
of Mathematical Psychology, 52 (4), 218–240. doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2008.01.009
Kelley, H., & Friedman, D. (2002). Learning to forecast price. Economic Inquiry, 40 (4),
556–573. doi:10.1093/ei/40.4.556
Kruschke, J. K. (1992). ALCOVE: An exemplar-based connectionist model of category
learning. Psychological Review, 99 (1), 22–44. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.99.1.22
Kruschke, J. K. (1996). Base rates in category learning. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 22 (1), 3–26.
doi:10.1037/0278-7393.22.1.3
Kruschke, J. K. (2001). Toward a unified model of attention in associative learning.
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 45 (6), 812–863. doi:10.1006/jmps.2000.1354
Kruschke, J. K., Kappenman, E. S., & Hetrick, W. P. (2005). Eye gaze and individual
differences consistent with learned attention in associative blocking and highlighting.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31 (5),
830–845. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.31.5.830
Lachnit, H., Schultheis, H., König, S., Üngör, M., & Melchers, K. (2008). Comparing
elemental and configural associative theories in human causal learning: A case for
RULES IN JUDGMENT 44
attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34 (2),
303–313. doi:10.1037/0097-7403.34.2.303
Lagnado, D. A., Newell, B. R., Kahan, S., & Shanks, D. R. (2006). Insight and strategy in
multiple-cue learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135 (2), 162–183.
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.135.2.162
Le Pelley, M. E., Mitchell, C. J., Beesley, T., George, D. N., & Wills, A. J. (2016).
Attention and associative learning in humans: An integrative review. Psychological
Bulletin, 142 (10), 1111–1140. doi:10.1037/bul0000064
Lucas, C. G., Griffiths, T. L., Williams, J. J., & Kalish, M. L. (2015). A rational model of
function learning. Psychological Bulletin & Review, 22, 1193–1215.
Mellers, B. A. (1980). Configurality in multiple-cue probability learning. American Journal
of Psychology, 93 (3), 429–443. doi:10.2307/1422722
Morris, S. B., & DeShon, R. P. (2002). Combining effect size estimates in meta-analysis
with repeated measures and independent-groups designs. Psychological Methods,
7 (1), 105–125. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.7.1.105
Nilsson, H., Winman, A., Juslin, P., & Hansson, G. (2009). Linda is not a bearded lady:
Configural weighting and adding as the cause of extension errors. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 138 (4), 517–534. doi:10.1037/a0017351
O’Doherty, J. P., Dayan, P., Friston, K., Critchley, H., & Dolan, R. J. (2003). Temporal
difference models and reward-related learning in the human brain. Neuron, 38 (2),
329–337. doi:10.1016/S0896-6273(03)00169-7
Pachur, T., & Olsson, H. (2012). Type of learning task impacts performance and strategy
selection in decision making. Cognitive Psychology, 65 (2), 207–240.
doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2012.03.003
Peterson, C. R., Hammond, K. R., & Summers, D. A. (1965). Multiple probability-learning
with shifting weights of cues. The American Journal of Psychology, 78 (4), 660–663.
doi:10.2307/1420932
RULES IN JUDGMENT 45
Pitt, M. A., & Myung, I. J. (2002). When a good fit can be bad. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 6 (10), 421–425. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01964-2
Rehder, B., & Hoffman, A. B. (2005). Eyetracking and selective attention in category
learning. Cognitive Psychology, 51 (1), 1–41. doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2004.11.001
Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in
the effectiveness of reinforcement and nonreinforcement. Classical Conditioning II:
Current Research and Theory, 21 (6), 64–99. doi:10.1101/gr.110528.110
Rieskamp, J. (2006). Perspectives of probabilistic inferences: Reinforcement learning and
an adaptive network compared. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 32 (6), 1355–1370. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.32.6.1355
Rolison, J. J., Evans, J. S. B. T., Dennis, I., & Walsh, C. R. (2012). Dual-processes in
learning and judgment: Evidence from the multiple cue probability learning
paradigm. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 118 (2), 189–202.
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.03.003
Scheibehenne, B., von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2015). Different strategies for
evaluating consumer products: Attribute- and exemplar-based approaches compared.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 46, 39–50. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2014.11.006
Schultz, W., & Dickinson, A. (2000). Neuronal coding of prediction errors. Annual Review
of Neuroscience, 23 (1), 473–500. doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.23.1.473
Schulz, E., Tenenbaum, J. B., Duvenaud, D., Speekenbrink, M., & Gershman, S. J. (2017).
Compositional inductive biases in function learning. Cognitive Psychology, 99, 44–79.
Schwarz, G. (1978). Estimating the dimension of a model. The Annals of Statistics, 6 (2),
461–464.
Shalev-Shwartz, S., & Singer, Y. (2006). Efficient learning of label ranking by soft
projections onto polyhedra. The Journal of Machine Learning Research, 7, 1567–1599.
RULES IN JUDGMENT 46
Shanks, D. R. (1991). Categorization by a connectionist network. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17 (3), 433–443.
doi:10.1037//0278-7393.17.3.433
Siegel, S., & Allan, L. G. (1996). The widespread influence of the Rescorla-Wagner model.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3 (3), 314–321. doi:10.3758/BF03210755
Speekenbrink, M., & Shanks, D. R. (2010). Learning in a changing environment. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 139 (2), 266–298. doi:10.1037/a0018620
Summers, D. A. (1969). Adaptation to change in multiple probability tasks. The American
Journal of Psychology, 82 (2), 235–240.
Sutton, R. S. (1992). Adapting bias by gradient descent: an incremental version of
delta-bar-delta. In Proceedings of the Tenth National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (pp. 171–176). MIT Press.
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1981). Toward a modern theory of adaptive networks:
Expectation and prediction. Psychological Review, 88 (2), 135–170.
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.88.2.135
Tobler, P. N., O’Doherty, J. P., Dolan, R. J., & Schultz, W. (2006). Human neural learning
depends on reward prediction errors in the blocking paradigm. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 95 (1), 301–310. doi:10.1152/jn.00762.2005
von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2009). Predicting sentencing for low-level crimes:
Comparing models of human judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied,
15 (4), 375–395. doi:10.1037/a0018024
Wagenmakers, E.-J., & Farrell, S. (2004). AIC model selection using Akaike weights.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11 (1), 192–196. doi:10.3758/BF03206482
Wigton, R. S. (1996). Social judgement theory and medical judgement. Thinking &
Reasoning, 2 (2-3), 175–190. doi:10.1080/135467896394492
RULES IN JUDGMENT 47
Ta
bl
e
1
M
od
el
Fi
ts
in
th
e
Re
an
al
ys
is.
SD
in
Pa
re
nt
he
se
s
M
od
el
Tr
ai
ni
ng
Te
st
BI
C
BI
C
w
n
R
M
SD
R
M
SD
LB
D
D
w
n
R
M
SD
Ba
se
lin
e
18
33
(7
8)
0.
04
(0
.1
8)
12
9.
2
(1
.2
)
9.
2
(1
.6
)
54
3
(1
45
)
0.
03
(0
.1
6)
9
14
.2
(6
.2
)
LM
S
ru
le
17
82
(1
44
)
0.
03
(0
.1
5)
12
8.
4
(2
.4
)
7.
8
(2
.5
)
43
5
(4
3)
0.
04
(0
.1
3)
10
9.
1
(3
.1
)
D
ec
ay
17
81
(1
46
)
0.
1
(0
.2
9)
29
8.
3
(2
.5
)
7.
9
(2
.6
)
43
1
(4
4)
0.
09
(0
.2
3)
26
8.
9
(3
)
C
ap
ac
ity
16
41
(1
16
)
0.
65
(0
.4
6)
18
5
5.
9
(1
.6
)
5.
4
(2
)
39
3
(4
0)
0.
52
(0
.4
5)
15
2
6.
3
(2
)
A
tt
en
tio
n
17
15
(1
23
)
0.
17
(0
.3
6)
49
6.
6
(1
.8
)
5.
7
(2
.1
)
41
3
(2
39
)
0.
32
(0
.4
1)
90
6.
5
(2
.4
)
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
—
—
—
4.
7
(1
.3
)
4.
3
(1
.5
)
—
—
—
5.
4
(1
.7
)
N
ot
e.
BI
C
=
Ba
ye
sia
n
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
C
rit
er
io
n;
BI
C
w
=
Ba
ye
sia
n
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
C
rit
er
io
n
we
ig
ht
;R
M
SD
=
R
oo
t
M
ea
n
Sq
ua
re
D
ev
ia
tio
n;
R
M
SD
LB
=
R
oo
t
M
ea
n
Sq
ua
re
D
ev
ia
tio
n
in
th
e
la
st
tr
ai
ni
ng
bl
oc
k;
D
=
D
ev
ia
nc
e;
D
w
=
D
ev
ia
nc
e
we
ig
ht
.
R
M
SD
in
th
e
tr
ai
ni
ng
ph
as
e
wa
sc
al
cu
la
te
d
on
ly
fo
rt
ria
l5
0-
25
0
w
he
re
al
lm
od
el
sy
ie
ld
pr
ed
ic
tio
ns
.
RULES IN JUDGMENT 48
Table 2
Model Fits in the Relearning Experiment. SD in Parentheses
Model BIC Generalization
BIC BICw n RMSD D Dw n RMSD
Baseline 2989 (77) 0 (0) 0 10 (0.9) 1514 (49) 0.16 (0.36) 8 10.5 (1.2)
LMS rule 2858 (181) 0.03 (0.12) 1 8.7 (1.9) 1467 (109) 0.1 (0.25) 5 9.2 (2.0)
Decay 2846 (186) 0.26 (0.43) 13 8.5 (2) 1477 (98) 0.16 (0.34) 8 9.5 (2.2)
Capacity 2715 (182) 0.65 (0.46) 34 7.2 (1.5) 1439 (180) 0.44 (0.48) 23 8.0 (2.4)
Attention 2798 (157) 0.06 (0.21) 3 7.9 (1.5) 3480 (3656) 0.14 (0.34) 7 12.5 (7.4)
Note. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; BICw = Bayesian Information Criterion weight; RMSD
= Root Mean Square Deviation; D = Deviance; Dw = Deviance weight.
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Figure 1 . Cue weights predicted by each model in the reanalysis compared to cue weights
from a rolling regression. Grey shaded areas show confidence intervals.
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Figure 3 . Judgment error (Root Mean Square Deviations, RMSD) averaged across all
participants (blue lines) and judgment error predicted on average by each model (black
lines) in each learning block. Red diamonds illustrate the absolute difference between both
learning paths; light grey lines depict model predictions for each single participant.
Columns show judgment error separately for each model (LMS rule, Decay, Capacity,
Attention). The upper row shows predicted judgment error when model parameters were
estimated using all learning trials; the lower row shows predicted judgment errors when
model parameters were estimated based the first 200 learning trials and used to predict the
learning path in the second half of the experiment. Error bars indicate bootstrapped
confidence intervals.
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Figure 4 . Judgment error in Root Mean Square Deviations (RMSD) for participants
classified to each model (blue lines) and judgment error predicted by the model on average
for those participants (black lines) in each learning block. Light gray lines depict model
predictions for each single participant. Columns show judgment error separately for each
model (LMS rule, Decay, Capacity, Attention), rows show predicted judgment error
separately for each fit indicator (Upper row: BIC, Lower row: Generalization). Error bars
indicate bootstrapped confidence intervals.
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Figure 6 . BIC and deviance weights for each model (separate lines) as a function of the
starting value for the cue weights (expressed in percentage of bias). The left panel shows
BIC weights from estimating the models based on all learning trials. The right panel shows
deviance weights from generalization for the second half of the experiment. Error bars
show ± standard error.
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Appendix A
Updating of cue weights in the capacity model
The capacity model proposes that the updated cue weights sum up to a capacity restriction
r, ∑
i
|wt+1,i| ≤ r (Busemeyer et al., 1993a). Using this restriction within the learning model
is similar to learning a LASSO regression that optimizes the regression weights under the
constraint that ∑
i
|wt+1,i| ≤ r. One optimization technique that efficiently solves the lasso
regression problem is projected gradient descent (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Wainwright, 2015).
In projected gradient descent, the algorithm first performs an unconstrained gradient step,
updates the regression weights, and next projects the updated regression weights back onto
the constrained space. To learn a lasso regression, thus it is possible to first update the cue
weights using the LMS rule and in a next step to project the updated cue weights back
onto the L1-ball. This is the approach we also pursued here.
Specifically, the problem reduces then to projecting onto the L1-ball only if the
capacity restriction is violated and, consequently, one can solve instead the simpler
problem (Duchi et al., 2008)
minimize ‖β − u‖22 s.t. ‖β‖1 ≤ r and β ≥ 0 (12)
with ui = |vi| and wt+1,i = sign(vi)βi. Within this problem, there exists a unique θ
such that
βi =
[
ui − θ
]+
(13)
where [x]+ is x for x > 0, else 0. Accordingly, θ needs to be found that fulfills
I∑
i
[
ui − θ
]+
= r with only those ui contributing to the sum that are not set to 0 during the
projection. Reformulating this equation yields
θ = 1
p
p∑
i=1
µi − r (14)
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with p indicating the non-zero elements after the update and µi indicating that ui is
sorted in descending order of magnitude (Shalev-Shwartz & Singer, 2006). Finally, p is
then the index for which
p = max{j ∈ [n] : µj − 1
j
(
j∑
q=1
µq − r) > 0}, (15)
that is, the index p is selected for which the absolute weight µj is still higher than the
difference between the averaged ordered absolute weights up to index p and the capacity
limit.
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Appendix B
Model estimation and model comparison
To evaluate the models’ relative performance, we employed two different model fit
indicators that vary in the degree to which they consider model generalizability and model
complexity: the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) as well as a
generalization test (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). Both techniques can be used to compare
non-nested models, but consider different sources of model flexibility. The BIC penalizes
more complex models by accounting for the number of free parameters, but does not
account for model complexity in terms of the functional form. In contrast, the
generalization test is an indicator of projective fit and assesses to what degree the models’
performance also generalizes to a range of new items or a new condition. In doing so, it
implicitly accounts for both model complexity in terms of the number of parameters as well
as functional form.
All models were fitted to participants’ responses by minimizing the deviance -2LL,
the negative summed log-likelihood L of the model given the data.
−2LL = −2 ·∑ ln(L) (16)
We calculated the likelihood as the probability density of participants’ judgments j
assuming a normal distribution, with the models’ predicted responses jˆt as the mean of the
normal distribution and a fitted standard deviation σ.
Bayesian Information Criterion
To calculate the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for each model, we estimated
parameters of all learning models based on all training trials for the reanalysis. In the
relearning study, we estimated each models’ parameters using all trials in the experiment.
The BIC was then calculated from each models’ deviance penalized with the number of free
model parameters k:
BIC = −2LL+ k lnn, (17)
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where n denotes the number of observations. Smaller BIC values indicate a better model
fit. BICs were converted into BIC weights (BICw,M) that give the posterior probability of
each model given the data (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004).
BICwM =
e−.5∆BICM∑
i
e−.5∆BICi
(18)
with ∆ BICM as the difference between model M and the best model in the set and ∆
BICi as the difference between a specific model i the best model.
Model fit measured in RMSD was calculated as the RMSD between model
predictions and participants’ judgments for the complete learning sequence. Model
predictions were constrained to the range of the scale from 0 to 50. To derive model
predictions for each learning block, we included for each participant a truncated normally
distributed random error matching the standard deviation from fitting and generated the
model predictions 1000 times. We then calculated the RMSD for each learning block and
simulation and averaged across the simulations, separately for each learning block.
Generalization Test
To account for model flexibility introduced by the functional form and to test
generalizability to new items and conditions, we also conducted a generalization test
(Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). Specifically, in the reanalysis we used the regression weights
obtained from model fitting at the end of the training phase to generate model predictions
for validation items. In the relearning study, we estimated each models’ parameters on the
first half of the learning blocks (before changing the task environment) and predicted
participants’ learning performance in the second half of the learning blocks (after the task
environment changed). In accordance with the BIC weights, we computed deviance weights
(Dw) to classify participants to each model. The reported overall RMSD was calculated as
the RMSD between model predictions and participants’ judgments for the second half of
the experiment. Model predictions were truncated to match the range of the scale. To
derive the predicted RMSD for each learning block in the validation trials, we generated
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model predictions for all validation trials 1000 times using the estimated standard
deviation from each model. The predicted RMSD for each learning block was calculated
separately for each learning block and simulation and averaged across the simulations.
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Appendix C
Model parameters for the reanalysis and the relearning experiment
Appendix C lists the estimated mean parameter values for the reanalysis (Table C1) and
the relearning experiment (Table C2) with standard deviations in parentheses. Parameter
estimates for the reanalysis were estimated based on all training trials. In the reanalysis,
parameter estimates for the BIC were estimated based on all trials in the experiment (cf.
Appendix B). Parameter estimates for the generalization test were estimated based on the
first 200 trials in the experiment.
Table C1
Model Parameter in the Reanalysis. SD in Parentheses
Model Parameter
λ δ r b0 SD
Baseline 0.082 (0.076) – – – 9.4 (1.2)
LMS rule 0.008 (0.005) – – – 8.7 (2.5)
Decay 0.043 (0.102) 7.1 (20.6) – – 8.6 (2.5)
Capacity 0.018 (0.016) – 17.3 (6.2) – 6.4 (1.6)
Attention 0.021 (0.28) – – -5.091 (3.25) 7.5 (1.8)
Note. λ = Learning rate; δ = Decay rate; r = Capacity restriction; b0 = Initial
learning rate for the single cues; SD = Standard Deviation.
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Appendix D
Specification of the full model using the combined psychological mechanisms
In line with the isolated psychological mechanisms, the full model including all
psychological mechanisms proposes that the judgment jˆt is a linear, additive combinations
jˆt =
∑
i
wt,i · xt,i (19)
with xt,∗=
[
xt,1 ... xt,n 1
]
where n denotes the number of cues and 1 denotes the
constant intercept. As in the attention model, the learning rates are adjusted before any
cue weight is updated by considering the global learning rate λ, the salience of the cues,
and a decaying memory trace, ht,i, that stores previous weight updates.
bt,i = bt−1,i +
λ · xt,i · (yt − jˆt) · ht,i
tδ
(20)
Compared to the decay model, the decay in learning rates here affects the global
learning rate λ. In a next step, the cue weights are updated with αt,i = ebt,i , resulting in
the unconstrained cue weights vt,i.
vt,i = wt,i + αt,i · xt,i · (yt − jˆt) (21)
In case the capacity limit is not reached during the update, the unconstrained cue
weights are used in the next trial, wt+1,i = vt,i and the degenerated memory trace ht,i is
updated with this current change in cue weights as in the attention model.
ht+1,i = ht,i
[
1− αt,i · x2t,i
]+
+ αt,i · xt,i · (yt − jˆt) (22)
In case, the capacity limit is reached during the update, however, the unconstrained
cue weights are adjusted to adhere to this limit without changing their initial directions,
wt+1,i = sgn(vt,i)βt,i, with the restricted weights βt,i calculated as the difference to the
capacity restriction,
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βt,i =
[
|vt,i| − θ]+ =
[
|vt,i| − 1
p
∗
(∑
p
|vt,p| − r
)]+
(23)
with [x]+ is x for x > 0, else 0. As a result, the memory trace ht+1,i that stores the
recent changes in weights with respect to the learning rates bt,i (Sutton, 1992) likewise has
to reflect this restriction.
ht+1,i =
δwt+1,i
δbt,i
= δ(sgn(vt,i)βt,i)
δbt,i
(24)
If the absolute unconstrained weight |vt,i| falls below or equal θ, |vt,i| ≤ θ,the memory
trace ht+1,i is set to 0. If the absolute unconstrained weight |vt,i| lies above θ, the memory
trace decays with
ht+1,i = ht,i
[
1−αt,i·x2t,i− 1p+ 1p sgn(vt,i)xt,i
∑
p
sgn(vt,p)αt,p·xt,p
]+
+
(
1− 1
p
)
αt,i·xt,i·(yt−jˆt) (25)
The decay in the memory trace reflects the adjustment with respect to the other cue
weights (in the first term of the equation) and is considered as strictly positive (Sutton,
1992). The update for the degenerated memory trace then similarly has to account for the
adjustment in the current change of cue weights,
(
1− 1
p
)
αt,i · xt,i · (yt − jˆt).
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Appendix E
Model fits for the combined mechanisms in the relearning experiment
Appendix E lists the model fits for the combined psychological mechanisms in the
relearning experiment (Table E1) with standard deviations in parentheses. BIC values were
determined based on all trials in the experiment (cf. Appendix B). D values for the
generalization test were calculated based on the last 200 trials in the experiment.
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